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Abstract: The defense techniques for machine learning are critical yet challenging due to 
the number and type of attacks for widely applied machine learning algorithms are 
significantly increasing. Among these attacks, the poisoning attack, which disturbs 
machine learning algorithms by injecting poisoning samples, is an attack with the greatest 
threat. In this paper, we focus on analyzing the characteristics of positioning samples and 
propose a novel sample evaluation method to defend against the poisoning attack catering 
for the characteristics of poisoning samples. To capture the intrinsic data characteristics 
from heterogeneous aspects, we first evaluate training data by multiple criteria, each of 
which is reformulated from a spectral clustering. Then, we integrate the multiple 
evaluation scores generated by the multiple criteria through the proposed multiple 
spectral clustering aggregation (MSCA) method. Finally, we use the unified score as the 
indicator of poisoning attack samples. Experimental results on intrusion detection data 
sets show that MSCA significantly outperforms the K-means outlier detection in terms of 
data legality evaluation and poisoning attack detection. 
 
Keywords: Poisoning attack, sample evaluation, spectral clustering, ensemble learning. 
1 Introduction 
In big data era, machine learning is becoming one of the most popular techniques in 
many applications because of its excellent performance. For example, in image 
recognition [Lingyun, Xiaobo, Jiaohua et al. (2018)], many machine learning algorithms 
have achieved higher recognition accuracy compared with human [Makili, Vega, 
Dormido-Canto et al. (2011)]. Besides, those algorithms also show significant successes 
in other domains, such as speech recognition [Hinton, Deng, Yu et al. (2012)], intrusion 
detection system (IDS) [Tsai, Hsu, Lin et al. (2009)], financial prediction [Wei, Liang 
and Longbing (2015)], web content analysis [Lingyun, Yan, Wei et al. (2018)] and data 
analytics [Chengzhang, Longbing, Qiang et al. (2018); Lingyun, Guohan, Qian et al. 
(2018)], etc. 
However, recent researches indicate that many attacks can destroy the application of 
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machine learning [Liu, Li, Zhao et al. (2018)]. Basically, these attacks can be classified 
into two categories: exploratory attack and causative attacks [Barreno, Nelson, Sears et al. 
(2006)]. Exploratory attack mainly destroys the learning model performance during the 
prediction stage. For example, the adversarial sample crafting methods proposed by 
[Nguyen, Yosinski and Clune (2015); Carlini, Mishra, Vaidya et al. (2016)] can easily 
manipulate a well-trained deep neural network (DNN). Causative attack mainly occurs in 
the model training stage. A typical causative attack method is the poisoning attack. 
Poisoning attack manipulates the learning model by modifying the features or labels of 
training data or injecting poisoning data that is similar yet has different distribution to 
training data. As evidenced by [Biggio, Fumera, Roli et al. (2012); Pan, Qiang, Wentao et 
al. (2018); Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. (2018)], poisoning attack seriously destroys the 
performance of learning models that invalidates various applications in multiple scenarios. 
Recently, many efforts have been paid on the defense technologies for poisoning attack. 
Existing methods reduce the impact of poisoning attack by adopting data sanitization and 
introducing robust learning algorithms. Data sanitization improves the quality of training 
data via filtering suspicious poisoning data [Nelson, Barreno, Chi et al. (2008); Laishram 
and Phoha (2016); Paudice, Munozgonzalez and Lupu (2018)]. In contrast, robust 
learning algorithms tolerant poisoning data through well-designated models. Although 
the above methods have achieved remarkable performance, they may fail to tackle the 
following challenges. First, most defense techniques may have a high false detection rate. 
These methods are sensitive to their hyper-parameters. Without well-tuned hyper-
parameters, they are likely to classify the legal samples as poisoning data, and thus, cause 
the high false detection rate. Second, most defense techniques only suit for a certain kind 
of attacks. Their scalability and generalization performance should be further improved. 
In this paper, we propose a novel poisoning attack defense technique. The proposed 
technique detects poisoning samples via a multiple spectral clustering aggregation 
(MSCA) method, which evaluates training samples from multiple views and provides a 
more robust solution. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 
• We propose an evaluation method to quantify the legitimacy of training samples. This 
method combines spectral clustering with similarity metric to provide reliable results. 
• We further integrate multiple spectral clustering results per different types of 
similarity metric and various number of clustering centers to form a robust sample 
evaluation method.  
• The MCSA evaluation results can be used to implement a variety of poisoning attack 
defense technologies under different assumptions catering for specific data 
characteristics. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related knowledge 
about the adversarial model and the adversarial sample evaluation. Section 3 details the 
spectral clustering-based evaluation method. Section 4 introduces the proposed multiple 
spectral clustering aggregation method. Section 5 shows the simulation results by using the 
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2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Adversary model 
Before studying a type of attack, we should make an assumption about the attacker.  
Wittel et al. [Wittel and Wu (2004)] first considered the attacker’s knowledge when 
studying the evasive attack of the spam filtering system. Later, some researchers 
suggested that it is necessary to consider the adversary goal and the adversary capability 
[Barreno, Nelson, Searset et al. (2006)]. These three aspects further formed the concept 
of the adversary model, and its specific meaning is as follow: 
• Adversary goal. Adversary goal is the final effect that the adversary wants to 
achieve. In this paper, the goal of the attacker is crafting poisoning data to destroy 
learning models. 
• Adversary knowledge. Before launching attack, adversary needs some information 
related to the targeted learning models. In this paper, we suppose the adversary know 
the whole training data, or the algorithms, even the concrete parameters of targeted 
models. In this assumption, the attacker can craft various poisoning samples, which 
can further verify the performance of proposed defense method. 
• Adversary capability. Besides the adversary knowledge, the adversary should have 
ability to launch attack. For the poisoning attack, previous works mainly contain two 
types. One assumes the adversary can change the labels or the features of training 
data [Zhao, An, Gao et al. (2017); Biggio, Nelson and Laskov (2012)]. The other 
assumption is that the adversary can inject adversarial samples into training data 
when the learning models are retraining [Rubinstein, Nelson, Huang et al. (2009); 
Kloft and Laskov. (2010)]. In this paper, we study the defense technology against 
the poisoning samples crafted by the latter assumption. 
2.2 Sample legitimacy evaluation 
2.2.1 Poisoning samples 
According to various adversary capabilities, the poisoning samples are mainly crafted by 
two ways. The first kind of poisoning sample is generated by modifying the features or 
the labels of existing training data. The second kind of poisoning sample is from the new 
injecting samples during the model retraining process. Both of the two kinds of poisoning 
samples have the same attack goal of drifting the initial distribution of training data. 
Referring to [Pan, Qiang, Wentao et al. (2018)], the poisoning samples have two features. 
• The sample should be recognized as legal sample by the classifier. This means that 
the poisoning samples are not easily identified as abnormal points. 
• The sample can change the original training data distribution, which can further 
affect the performance of the model trained from the training data. 
In general, the poisoning samples can cause data drifting of the training data without 
arousing the suspicion of the classifier. Besides, it can also affect the performance of the 
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2.2.2 Sample legitimacy evaluation 
Using the poisoned training data without any distinction can seriously decrease the 
performance of learning model. So, it is critical to properly evaluate the training data.  
From above introduction, the poisoning data can be defined as the data which can destroy 
the distribution of training data. In the contrary, legal data represents the initial training 
data without any contamination by the poisoning data.  
Therefore, the sample legitimacy evaluation can quantify the significance or confidence 
of the training data. So, we define a metric, named Legitimacy Coefficient (LC), to 
measure the legality of training samples. Higher LC represents that the sample is more 
closed to the true sample distribution, while lower LC shows that the sample is farer away 
from the true sample distribution. 
3 Single spectral clustering for sample evaluation 
Combining with the above description of the poisoning samples’ characteristics, we first 
design a single spectral clustering evaluation method to evaluate the LC value of training 
samples. Furthermore, we use the ensemble strategy to integrate multiple spectral 
clustering learners and then propose a multiple spectral clustering aggregation method, 
which can be used to evaluate the legitimacy of training data. In this section, we detail the 
single spectral clustering evaluation method. 
3.1 Spectral clustering 
Spectral clustering is a clustering algorithm developed from graph theory. The main idea is 
treating all samples as points in high-dimensional space and connecting them with edges to 
form an undirected weight map. The weight ijw  of each edge in the graph can be used to 
represent the distance relationship between sample point ix  and sample point jx . The edge 
weight of the two sample points will be high if the distance of the two samples is far, and 
vice versa. The clustering can be realized by cutting the undirected graph, which can ensure 
the sum of edge weights between two independent sub graphs is as low as possible, and the 
sum of edge weights inside the sub graph is as high as possible. 
The initial spectral clustering can achieve good clustering performance, and the clustering 
result can provide a benchmark reference for evaluating the training sample. According 
to [Yu and Shi (2003)], the spectral clustering result is decided by three aspects: 
• The computation way of adjacency metric W . In spectral clustering, the edge 
weight ijw  can be used to measure the relationship between two samples. 
Considering the edge weights of all training samples, we can get the adjacency 

















                (1) 
 
 
Defense Against Poisoning Attack via Evaluating Training Samples                         821 
where ijw  refers to the edge weight between i th sample and j th sample. 
• The standard graph laplace metric = −L W D , where W  is adjacency metric and 




















d w  represents the sum of edge weight ijw  between i th sample and 
the other samples in the whole data set. 
• The clustering way. The last step in spectral clustering is using clustering method 
such as K-means to deal with the standard feature metric F . 
3.2 Single spectral clustering sample rating method 
Based on spectral clustering method, we further utilize the clustering result and similarity 
metric W  to realize the evaluation of training data. The specific process of evaluating on 
each sample is shown in Algorithm 1, xiv  represents the LC value of sample ix .  
Algorithm 1：Single spectral clustering for sample evaluation 
Input ： Sample set 1 2{ , ,..., }= nX x x x  with label p , The generating way of 
similarity metric G , Class number k  
Output： Rating scores 1 2{ , ,..., }= x x xnV v v v  
 1. Initialize: =∅synX  
2. According to G , generate similarity metric W  
3. Divide X  into k  groups of samples 1 2{ , ,... }kD D D  using spectral clustering 
4. Choose iD  as the legal sample set { ,..., }=normal i mD x x , other class ( )≠jD j i  
as the candidate sample sets, iD  is the closest class to the centre of all samples 
5. for 1=i  to n  do 






S w , where ijw  is the similarity between ix  and jx  
7. end for 
8. Sort 1{ ,..., }= x xnS S S  in descending order, the index of ix  is the score for ix  
Higher value represents higher confidence of sample’s legitimacy. In the contrary, lower 
score refers to lower confidence of sample’s legitimacy. The score for each sample is 
determined by two factors. First, the selection of similarity measure for spectral 
clustering can be a gaussian kernel function, polynomial kernel function or sigmoid 
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kernel function. Different kernel functions can fit different data distributions. Second, the 
selection of legal samples class decides the benchmark of basic legitimacy evaluating, 
which further affect the LC value of samples. Besides, the way generating adjacency 
matrix and the basic clustering way determine the clustering results, which further affect 
the legal class selection. 
4 Multiple spectral clustering aggregation for sample evaluation 
For a data set, kernel function type (gaussian kernel, polynomial kernel, sigmoid kernel) 
and the number of cluster results can influence the evaluation of sample legitimacy. In 
order to reduce the parameters sensitivity of the algorithm, we combine spectral 
clustering with ensemble learning to achieve more robust sample legitimacy evaluation. 
4.1 Ensemble strategy 
The main idea of ensemble learning is integrating multiple base learners into a strong 
learner through some combination strategies. The performance of the integrated strong 
learner is more robust than that of each base learner. In ensemble learning, the 
combination strategy of the base learners directly affects the performance of the 
integrated strong learner. We simply describe three common combination strategies 
[Dietterich (2000)] as follows: 
• Averaging strategy: This is the most common combination strategy for basic 
learners, including the simple average method and the weighted average method. 
• Voting strategy: Assuming that the output of each sample is predicted from n  
learners, the voting method judges the output of the sample by counting the labels 
predicted by these learners. There are three main ways: the majority of voting 
methods, the relative majority voting method and the weighted voting method. 
• Learning strategy: The averaging strategy and voting strategy may not be suitable 
in some cases. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a nonlinear relationship through 
learning method to integrate the base learners. 
4.2 Average ensemble strategy for multiple spectral clustering aggregation 
In this section, we used the averaging strategy as an example to design an aggregation 
method. The specific process is shown in algorithm 2, MSCA uses the sum of all scores 
rated by various spectral clustering learners as the LC value of the sample evaluated by 
MSCA. After that, the defender can properly combine the LC value with specific defense 
method to defense against poisoning attack. For example, the defender can adopt the idea 
of data sanitization. A simple method is removing the samples with the lower LC values, 
which are classified as suspicious poisoning data by MSCA. Besides, based on the value 
of sample legitimacy provided by MSCA, the defender can further adopt bagging or 
boosting strategy to ensemble various learners. The LC value can be used to adjust the 
weights of the samples in the training process, which can reduce the impact of poisoning 
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Algorithm 2：Multiple spectral clustering aggregation (MSCA)  
Input：Sample set 1 2{ , ,..., }= NX x x x  with label p , the set of generating way of 
similarity metric 1 2{ , ,..., }mG G G , the set of clustering number 1 2{ , ,..., }nk k k   
Output： Rating scores 1 2{ , ,..., }= x x xNV v v v  
 1. Initialize: =∅synX  
2. for 1=i  to n  do 
3.     Choose the number of clustering jk  
4.     Input , ,i jG k X  to algorithm 1, get the score 
ijV  
5. end for 







V v  for sample ( 1,..., )=px p N  
7. 1{ ,..., }= x xNV v v  
5 Experiment 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed defense method by extensive 
experiments described as follows: Firstly, we introduce the experimental setting in this 
paper, including the targeted poisoning samples crating methods and the specific 
parameters setting of proposed MSCA method. Then we visually show the performances 
of various methods defense against BEBP poisoning method on synthetic data set. Finally, 
we compare the proposed method with other defense methods on two real data sets to 
further demonstrate its stability and effectiveness in the assessment of training data. 
5.1 Experimental setting 
5.1.1 Poisoning methods 
For the poisoning sample crafting methods, we chose two typical poisoning methods, i.e., 
Batch-EPD Boundary Pattern (BEBP) [Pan, Qiang, Wentao et al. (2018)] and Centre-
drifting Boundary Pattern (CBP) [Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. (2018)]. They can effectively 
craft boundary pattern data, which can serve as poisoning data to seriously destroy the 
performance of six different machine learning models.  
BEBP This method first randomly divides the training data set into several groups, and 
then calculates the edge pattern data and corresponding normal vectors of each group 
data using edge pattern detection algorithm. After that, by pushing the edge pattern data 
towards their normal vectors, we can get pushed data, which can be further selected by 
boundary pattern detection algorithm to get the boundary pattern data. 
CBP Similar to BEBP, CBP also use the boundary pattern detection method to select the 
pushed data. The difference is that CBP pushes the whole training data toward the same 
center vector to get pushing data. And the center vector can be easily obtained by 
calculating the vector between the two class centres.  
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Besides, the method in Pan et al. [Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. (2018)] can launch poisoning 
attack with weak adversary model, while the attacker should have a strong adversary 
model in Pan et al. [Pan, Qiang, Wentao et al. (2018)]. For this paper mainly study the 
defense technology, we suppose that targeted models are in worse case, which means that 
the attacker has enough knowledge about targeted learning models.  
5.1.2 Parameters setting 
For the parameters setting of BEBP and CBP, we kept the setting in [Pan, Qiang, Wentao 
et al. (2018); Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. (2018)], wherein the poisoning ratio and the 
poisoning round are set as 0.07 and 5, respectively.  
As for the proposed MSCA, we selected six base spectral clustering learners with 
different kernel types and clustering centers. Specifically, we set the numbers of 
clustering centre as three and six, and each clustering centre number is combined with 
three kernel types as follows:  
• Gaussian kernel:  
2( , ) ( || || / )σ= − −i j i jk x x exp x x  
• Sigmoid kernel:  
( , ) tanh( )α= +i j i ik x x x y c  
• Polynomial kernel: 
( , ) ( )α= + di j i ik x x x y c  
To focus on evaluation method itself, we simply used the default kernel parameters in the 
sklearn tool. 
5.2 Experiment on synthetic data set 
In order to visualize the defense performance of proposed method, we compared the 
proposed MSCA method with K-means. Meanwhile, the assess result of each base 
spectral clustering learner is also performed on the synthetic data set. 
As shown in the Fig. 1, we can see that the detection results of suspicious poisoning data 
using various defense methods regarding the poisoning points caused by BEBP method. 
Obviously, the MSCA method performs better than K-means method and its performance 
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Figure 1: The comparison of various defense methods on synthetic data set (The Fig. (a) 
represents the poisoning effect caused by BEBP, the red round points refer to the 
boundary poisoning data. The Figs. (b)-(i) represent the defense performance of various 
defense methods, where the red round points refer to the illegal points detected by 
various defense methods.)  
5.3 Experiments on intrusion detection data sets 
Referring to previous work [Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. (2018)], poisoning attack via 
injecting poisoning data always occurs in the retraining process of learning model. 
Network intrusion detection system is a typical domain whose model needs be retrained. 
So in this section, we evaluate the performance of proposed method by simulating 
defense experiment on two network intrusion detection data sets.  
5.3.1 Performance metric 
Regarding an IDS system, accuracy is the primary performance metric. Hence, we adopt 
accuracy in this paper to evaluate the performance reduction of machine learning-based IDSs 




TP TN FN FP
                (3) 
where true positive (TP) is the number of truly abnormal samples that are classified as 
abnormal ones by IDSs, true negative (TN) means the number of truly normal samples 
that are treated as normal ones, false positive (FP) refers to the number of truly normal 
samples classified as abnormal ones, and false negative (FN) represents the number of 
truly abnormal samples classified as normal ones. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution of the randomly selected data regarding the NSL-KDD  
 Normal Probing DOS U2R R2L 
Training data 2000 300 3790 32 350 
Evaluating data 2000 500 3900 20 400 
5.3.2 Data sets 
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed defense method, we chose two public 
intrusion detection data sets. 
NSL-KDD This data set is a revised version of KDDCUP99, which is a well-known 
benchmark data set for evaluating the performance of IDSs. NSL-KDD contains five 
categories of samples (one normal and four abnormal). Moreover, each sample has 41 
features. 
Kyoto 2006+ This data set proposed in Song et al. [Song, Takakura, Okabe et al. (2011)] 
is another famous intrusion detection data set. This data set has been collected from 
honeypots and regular servers that are deployed at the Kyoto University since 2006. 
Moreover, Kyoto 2006+ contains three types of samples, i.e., normal, known attack and 
unknown one, and each sample has 24 features. 
Referring to Pan et al. [Pan, Qiang, Wentao et al. (2018); Pan, Wentao, Qiang et al. 
(2018)], we randomly selected training samples and evaluation samples from NSL-KDD 
and Kyoto 2006+. The sample distribution of training data and evaluating data selected 
from NSL-KDD shows in Tab. 1. Similarly, we randomly selected 13292 samples from 
the traffic data collected during 27-31, August 2009 regarding the Kyoto 2006+ data set, 
including 6472 samples as training data and 6820 samples as evaluating data. 
Targeted Models From the previous work we can know that the SVM algorithms were 
fragile facing the boundary pattern poisoning samples [Pan, Qiang, Wentao et al. (2018)]. 
Therefore, we focus on the defense methods towards SVM algorithms. Specifically, we 
select three typical SVM algorithms, including SVM with a radial basis function kernel 
(SVM-RBF), SVM with a linear kernel (SVM-linear) and SVM with a sigmoid kernel 
(SVM-Sigmoid). 
5.3.3 Experimental results 
According to above experimental setting, we evaluated the ACC of various defense 
methods, including K-means clustering with outlier removal, the proposed MSCA 
method and its base spectral clustering with outlier removal, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
targeted poisoning samples are generated by BEBP and CBP, and both of the two kinds 
of poisoning methods are performed on NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+. 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 describe the ACC changing with no defense, K-means and MSCA 
method under 5 round poisoning attack using BEBP and CBP on NSL-KDD data set. The 
No defense method represents the model performance without any defense measure, 
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Figure 2: The comparison of ACC with various methods defensing against poisoning 
data crafted by BEBP on NSL-KDD data set  
Tab. 2 and Tab. 3 show the results of different methods defensing against 5 round 
poisoning attack using BEBP and CBP on Kyoto 2006+ data set. Specially, we used 
Means, Best and Worst in Tab. 2 and Tab. 3 to represent the average ACC, the best ACC 
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Figure 3: The comparison of ACC with various methods defensing against poisoning 
data crafted by CBP on NSL-KDD data set  
From the above experimental results, we can see that proposed MSCA method can 
effectively defense the poisoning attack. Specifically, we can compare the defense 
performance from three aspects. 
• As for the performance of defense against different poisoning samples, MSCA can 
improve the performance of targeted models under poisoning attack of BEBP and 
CBP both on NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+. It is noteworthy that MSCA performs 
better with the increasing of poisoning rounds. This means that the proposed method 
can keep the stable and effective performance of targeted models in their long-term 
retraining process under the disturbance of poisoning attack.  
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• Compared with K-means defense method in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, MSCA performs 
better in defensing against the poisoning samples crafted by BEBP and CBP on 
NSL-KDD data set. Relatively speaking, MSCA can better defense against the 
poisoning samples crafted by BEBP, but the experimental results using MSCA and 
K-means both perform less effective in defensing against the CBP poisoning method. 
Table 2: Comparative results of ACC on Kyoto 2006+ under 5 round poisoning attack 
using BEBP 
Targeted 
model Defense Round1 Round2 Round3 Round4 Round5 
SVM- 
RBF 
No defense 98.64% 97.02% 95.93% 94.06% 92.41% 
MSCA 98.17% 97.42% 96.33% 95.87% 94.72% 
Mean 98.02% 97.13% 95.98% 95.14% 94.24% 
Best 98.36% 97.64% 96.34% 95.81% 95.02% 
Worse 97.31% 96.52% 95.70% 94.32% 93.45% 
SVM- 
linear 
No defense 98.67% 97.57% 96.52% 95.18% 93.75% 
MSCA 98.15% 97.69% 96.78% 95.57% 94.38% 
Mean 98.27% 97.60% 96.56% 95.44% 94.20% 
Best 98.48% 97.73% 96.63% 95.63% 94.32% 
Worse 98.15% 97.51% 96.45% 95.09% 94.09% 
SVM- 
Sigmoid 
No defense 97.66% 96.08% 94.08% 92.50% 91.03% 
MSCA 95.93% 94.87% 94.41% 93.45% 92.35% 
Mean 95.87% 94.82% 94.39% 93.42% 92.10% 
Best 96.84% 95.35% 94.57% 93.85% 92.36% 
Worse 95.49% 94.35% 93.81% 93.21% 91.47% 
 
Table 3: Comparative results of ACC on Kyoto 2006+ under 5 round poisoning attack 
using CBP 
Targeted 
model Defense Round1 Round2 Round3 Round4 Round5 
SVM- 
RBF 
No defense 98.57% 96.91% 94.08% 92.05% 90.60% 
MSCA 98.28% 96.69% 95.87% 93.84% 93.21% 
Mean 98.28% 96.43% 95.46% 93.65% 92.89% 
Best 98.54% 96.76% 95.79% 93.93% 93.39% 
Worse 97.81% 95.85% 95.06% 93.14% 92.59% 
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SVM- 
linear 
No defense 98.39% 97.08% 94.67% 92.78% 91.30% 
MSCA 97.54% 96.48% 95.45% 94.20% 93.23% 
Mean 97.46% 96.37% 95.23% 93.98% 92.97% 
Best 97.87% 96.52% 95.41% 94.26% 93.29% 
Worse 96.67% 96.17% 95.00% 93.44% 92.45% 
SVM- 
Sigmoid 
No defense 97.30% 96.34% 94.17% 91.71% 89.93% 
MSCA 97.00% 95.54% 95.06% 94.21% 93.06% 
Mean 96.82% 95.33% 94.66% 93.97% 92.65% 
Best 97.00% 95.49% 94.85% 94.29% 93.21% 
Worse 96.57% 95.23% 94.21% 93.61% 91.96% 
• From Tab. 2 and Tab. 3 we can see that MSCA with the average ensemble strategy is 
more stable than the single spectral clustering method. Although it is difficult to use 
average ensemble strategy achieving better performance than the best spectral clustering 
learner, MSCA can achieve the comparable performance with the best one among all 
base spectral clustering learners. Moreover, MSCA performs significantly better than the 
worst one as well slightly better than the average ACC of all base learners. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel sample evaluation method using spectral 
clustering and ensemble strategy. Firstly, we propose using spectral clustering algorithm 
to evaluate training samples and rate their LC values. To address the drawback of single 
spectral clustering, we further present the MSCA method to realize more robust 
evaluation for training sample. Experiments on real intrusion detection data sets 
demonstrate the proposed sample evaluation method can effectively defense against 
poisoning sample crafted by different methods. 
In future, it is worthwhile to do more in-depth studies on the scalability of the proposed 
sample evaluation method. Moreover, designing more robust algorithms using the result 
of sample evaluation will be a worthwhile work as well. 
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